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Empirical evidence of the distribution of firms by owner
identity for a set of European countries reveals substantial
differences. Using the sensitivity of a firm’s sales to demand shocks
as a measure of risk-taking behavior, the paper explores if owner
identity affects the willingness of the firms to seize market
opportunities. Consistent with a hypothesis of risk-avoidance
behavior, family-owned companies appear to underreact to changes
in market demand. Conversely, industrial and nonconcentrated
family-owned firms appear more prone to deal with venturing risk,
especially in the case of fast-growing companies or demand changes
in nondomestic markets. [JEL Classification: G32, L25]
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1. - Introduction
Increasing sales is usually what most people think to be a sign
of a successful strategy for a company. The specialized press often
reports examples of companies that indicate sales as their major
targets and use it as a motto for promoting the company. “Our
company has grown twenty fold in the past twenty years”,
1 said
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1 Indesit Annual Report, 2001.
07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 149the President of Indesit Company, Vittorio Merloni, the largest
Italian producers of household appliances and among the five
largest world producers. High growth rates of sales are not so
infrequent to find, especially in early company life, when a talented
entrepreneur invents a new product and sells it to the market. But
a long-lasting growth is far less frequent. It requires a constant
upgrading of the firm resource set, in order to seize opportunities
in a rapidly changing environment. It needs a large amount of
ability and risk taking; therefore, despite its importance, many
companies may not succeed in achieving it. When asked to explain
the source of his enduring success, President Merloni replied:
“Every year, we renew more than 50% of our products, with respect
to their design and technical features”
2.
Revenue-oriented strategies are inherently risky and require a
particular risk attitude in the decision makers (entrepreneurs). The
reason is not simply casual. Whereas defining actions targeted to
reduce inefficiency and costs (i.e. cost restructuring) is primarily
a matter of managerial skills, revenue generation requires
entrepreneurship. The skill required to improve the revenue side
of a firm’s operations (sales) are very different from the managerial
ability, but is not different from those needed to start a new
business: firm must reinvent products and find new markets in
which they can be sold. Discovering an area of a firm’s
comparative advantage calls for much more innovation and
involves much greater uncertainty than eliminating inefficiencies,
especially when the firm faces new environments in highly
competitive export markets (Frydman et al., 1998, Grosfeld and
Roland, 1996). This is more likely to occur in a period of rapid
demand changes, when a firm’s sales, far from being predictable
on the basis of an exogenously given demand curve, depend on
its ability to accommodate the largely unpredictable decisions of
potential customers and consumers.
Seizing market opportunities typically involves taking risk.
Organizations may take risk hoping to improve their current
situation by searching alternative routines and opportunities
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
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2007). Agency theory stresses that the extent of involvement in
risky activities is likely to be influenced by the ownership of
the firm (Fama, 1980, George et al., 2005, Brunninge et al.,
2007). The standard assumption in economics and strategic
management is that owner wants the company to maximize
economic profits or shareholder value. However, when markets
are incomplete, even profit-maximizing owners may disagree
about corporate strategy, because of different preferences
regarding risk and the time profile of expected cash flow
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).
Risk attitude and time horizon play a key role in strategy for-
mulation in family firms. Despite the fact that long-term per-
spective could make them more prone, or inherently able, to sus-
tain risk (Zellweger, 2007), the existence of growth opportunities
that expire after the founder’s tenure may favor a “risk-avoidance
behaviour” (Almeida and John, 2001). Therefore, family firms will
be expected to reduce, or even to avoid totally, venturing risk in
their business decisions. A general motivation to preserve com-
pany control may further encourage ‘risk-avoidance behavior’ in
these companies. As a large proportion of the owner’s wealth is
invested in the business, small and medium-sized family firms can
be expected to be risk-adverse (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), to pay
less attention to growth-oriented strategies (Upton et al., 2003,
Kotey, 2005), and to avoid risky business decisions that may en-
danger firm survival (Gomez Mejia, 2007). Similarly, the willing-
ness to engage in strategic change activities — such as corporate
diversification, product innovation, and entering new internation-
al markets — reduces as ownership and control increases (Brun-
ninge et al., 2007). Therefore, family firms are usually more con-
servative, resistant to change, blockaded by internal conflict, and
by defensive attitude toward survival. Also, due to the founder’s
personal involvement, there is an unwillingness to change strate-
gy: “over time, owners may become insulated from environmen-
tal and performance changes and may fail to perceive and react
to critical environmental and organizational changes” (Goodstein
and Boeker, 1991). Aging may also accentuate strategic inertia and
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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tive advantage of the company (Cucculelli and Micucci, 2006). In
contrast to family firms, industrial and financial-owned compa-
nies are more likely to follow a strict profit-maximizing behavior.
These companies usually benefit from skilled professional man-
agers who are more likely to undertake ambitious investment pro-
grams to exploit economies of scale and less likely to pursue niche
strategies related to flexibility or product differentiation. Thus, risk
avoidance should not be a major concern for these companies and
their ability to seize market opportunities is expected to be large
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).
Empirical evidence of the distribution of firm based on owner
identity for a set of European countries reveals substantial dif-
ferences (Table 7 in the Appendix). Half of the listed companies
in the UK are owned by financial owners, whereas the situation
is totally reverse in Spain, Germany, and Italy, where more than
half of the listed companies are owned by individual investors and
industrial firms. With regards to these last two groups, the share
of industrial companies is very large in Germany (45.6%) and
moderate in Italy (29.7%) and Spain (23.1%). Conversely, indi-
vidual investors prevail in Italy (26.6%) and Spain (26.0%), where-
as their share is the lowest in the UK (1.9%). A similar large dis-
persion is observed for public owners, whose share varies from
null in the UK to 13.4 in Italy, and foreign investors, whose share
range from 14.4% in Italy to 34.4% in the UK.
As organizations may take risk by searching alternative
routines and opportunities that change the status quo, different
ultimate owners may impact a firm’s strategy according to their
attitude to face risk. Following an agency approach, the paper uses
the sensitivity of a firm’s sales to industry shocks to test if the
identity of the owner affects the company’s ability to seize market
opportunities,  i.e. to face venturing risk. Sales sensitivity to
demand shocks is used to measure how much does the owners’
attitude toward risk and growth affects the company’s willingness
to take actions aimed to change the status quo. A low (high)
sensitivity to demand shocks should therefore signal the
preference to take decisions that are more (less) conservative than
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
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avoiding behavior by the company in its strategic choices. 
The empirical results show that owner identity does affect the
ability of the company to react to demand shocks. Consistent with
a hypothesis of risk-avoidance behavior, small and medium-sized
family-owned companies appear to under react to changes in
market demand, notably when ownership is highly concentrated
and growth opportunities are significant. However, these companies
confirm their status of good performers when pure profitability
measures are used. Conversely, industrial and nonconcentrated
family-owned firms appear more prone to deal with venturing risk,
especially when the intensity of risk in a firm’s decision is large, as
in the case of fast-growing companies or when there are changes
in demand coming from nondomestic markets.
If the under reaction to demand shocks is consistent with a
risk-avoidance behavior, sectors may be expected to be less keen
to tolerate risk, thus failing to achieve sustained growth, as the
share of their ‘risk-avoiding’ companies increases. Therefore, the
owner identity comes out as key issue also for understanding
sectoral and country competitiveness. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
empirical methodology, whereas estimated results are shown in
Section 3. Section 4 discusses some implications for sectoral
competitiveness and Section 5 gives some conclusions.
2. - The Empirical Model
The empirical model tests the responsiveness of a company’s
sales to changes in market demand by groups of ultimate owners.
The empirical approach is derived from Bertrand, Mehta and
Mullainathan (2002) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007). Bertrand et
al. (2002) use variation in mean industry performance as a source
of profit shocks in the single company, in order to trace the
propagation of shocks through a business group. Sraer and
Thesmar estimate a fixed-effect model where single firm’s
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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sales and in log employment. In both the models, industry shocks
are an ideal candidate to measure a firms’ sensitivity since they
affect individual firms but are — to a large extent — beyond the
control of individual firms. Regression (1) is estimated by using
a firm’s annual sales as the dependent variable. Independent
variables are the Eurostat Annual Turnover Index (ATI), which
proxies for sectoral industry demand, and its interaction with the
firm’s ultimate owner:
(1)
where sales is the turnover of firm i, sector k and time t, controls
is a set of control variables (see next paragraph), and time are
time dummies. Firms’ sales are indexed as 2000 = 100. Fij = (Fi1,
Fi2,  Fi3,  Fi4) is the owner status variable (index j indicates the
individual owner), with Fi1, Fi2, Fi3, Fi4 indicating one of the four
firm’s ultimate owners selected: family, industrial company,
financial company, and state (See the Appendix for the Amadeus
definition of ultimate owner).
3 The coefficient b measures the
general sensitivity of firms’ sales to industry turnover, whereas the
coefficient  cj (from the interaction term Fij*ATI) captures the
sensitivity of each group of owners. A positive (negative)
coefficient of this interaction variable signals a greater sensitivity
to industry shocks (Bertrand et al., 2002). 
The variable ATI proxies for the industry demand conditions
and is given by two different measures: i) the Eurostat Annual
Turnover Index (ATI) for EU15 in nominal terms and ii) the
aggregate turnover by industry (3 digit NACE Rev. 1) for the
companies included in the sample, computed by aggregating sales
for firms within the same sector and by subtracting firm i turnover
(Bertrand et al., 2002; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007).
4
   
sales a b ATI c F ATI d control ikt kt j ij kt =+ + + () ( .) ( s st i m e kt ikt )++ ε
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
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4  The second measure, reported under ii), of industry demand conditions
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showing the evolution of the market of goods and services in the
industrial sector. It records the evolution of turnover over longer
periods of time. It is therefore the objective of this indicator to
measure the market activity in the industrial sector in value. The
classification follows the NACE Rev. 1 (Statistical classification of
economic activities in the European Community, Eurostat, 1996).
The turnover of industry index is not deflated. The version used
here is the index 2000 = 100. The Index breakdown by industry
provides a very close connection between the demand at the
European level and the trend of single company sales. The
industry breakdown is for 101 sectors by NACE 3 digits.
The choice to select a highly disaggregated index of industry
sales (101 sectors) originates from the drawback signaled by Sraer
and Thesmar (2007, page 732) on aggregate industry data. If the
industry classification is too crude to account for the relevant mar-
ket of the firm, the estimated sensitivity parameters may have a
substantial downward bias, much akin to a measurement error
(i.e. a 13-industry classification may show a very modest ex-
planatory power). This weakness has been tackled by using a de-
tailed 3-digit 101-industry classification. By estimating equation
(1) in double log, the model provides an empirical measure of the
responsiveness of a firm’s turnover to industry demand.
5
2.1 Control Variables
The literature on family firms shows that the concentration
of the ownership can affect firm’s performance (Demsetz and
Villalonga, 2001). In order to isolate the pure effect of family
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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closely resembles the dynamics observed in sectoral ATI. Because of the larger
significance of the Eurostat ATI in describing the evolution of markets at the
European level, the following empirical analysis reports only estimates from this
last variable. 
5 On the basis of a Breush - Pagan LM test, which is decisive that there
are individual effects, and the Hausman test, which suggests that these effects
are uncorrelated with other variables in the model, a random effect model has
been chosen, also due to the specific interest in time-invariant regressors
(identity).
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concentration, the share of the first and largest owner, as well as
the concentration ratio (CR3) of the first three shareholders in
each company, has been included in each regression as controls. 
Also, the number of market segments — in terms of ISIC
codes — in which a single company operates has been controlled
for, which is done to exclude the impact of a firm’s “external”
growth on performance. As the company data are aggregated
across ISIC codes, it is likely that the actual sales growth rate can
be higher, the larger the number of market segments in which the
firm operates. Controlling for this diversification effect allows for
avoiding the underestimation of the sensitivity of a company’s
sales to demand in largely diversified companies. 
In the empirical literature on family business, there exist some
discrepancies with respect to the influence that different genera-
tions exert on a firm’s growth behavior. Zahra (2005) and Oko-
roafo (1999) found that as new generations bring fresh knowledge
and strategic renewal, older family-owned companies will realize
higher growth rates of sales compared with their younger coun-
terparts. Maury (2007) also shows that an active family control is
beneficial to performance in older companies. Vice-versa, the issue
of lifecycle, together with the family orientation of newer gen-
erations, supports the hypothesis of a lower growth in older com-
panies compared with younger ones (Cucculelli and Micucci,
2006). Finally, a very large literature (see Bertrand and Shoar,
2006) shows that the institutional framework and social norms at
country level affect a firm’s performance. Therefore, controls for
age and country dummies have been included.
2.2 Data
Data are available for the decade 1995-2004. The sectoral break
includes 101 Nace 3-digit manufacturing industries. Firm-level data
are from the Amadeus (Analyse MAjor Database from European
Sources) database, collected by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). The
company accounting statements are harmonized by BvD, making
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
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firms. Due to national legislations, the coverage of financial variables
varies across countries. This limits the number of countries included
in the analysis. Given that the firms included in the Amadeus Top
1 million companies have at least 10 employees, this inclusion
criterion makes the source biased against the smallest companies.
The paper then sets a criterion of having a number on employees
in the 20-1,000 range. Thus, the sample provides an excellent
possibility to analyze the behavior of small and medium-sized firms.
Firms in the sample are selected from 26 European countries. The
total number of companies is 9,688, with a high prevalence of
Western European countries (13 countries with 7,856 companies).
6
3. - Empirical Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The distribution of the owner identity across industries is not
uniform. Table 1 shows that family-owned firms are prevalent in
low-technology sectors, such as footwear, clothing, light mechan-
ical apparel, plastic, and rubber. They complement almost per-
fectly with industrial-owned firms, which are prevalent in scale-
and technology-intensive sectors (industrial ownership is preval-
ent in 17 two-digit sectors out of 21). State-owned companies are
concentrated in the mechanical sector and in motor vehicle and
tobacco industries. Financial ownership is present in motor
vehicle industry, electrical machinery, wood product industry, and
chemical industry. These differences suggest that it is extremely
important to take into account industry variations in demand.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample broken
down by owner identity. Data in the last column of Table 2 refer
to all firms in the sample, i.e. they include also data from 1,444
firms whose ultimate owners are different from the four explicitly
indicated in the top columns of Table 2. Residual owners are:
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 158Foundations, Employees/Managers, Insurance companies, Mutual
and pension funds, and self-Owned and other unnamed
shareholders. Family firms account for 27.4% of the total sample
firms and reach up to 32.3% in the smaller sub-sample of the four
identities presented in Table 2; they are younger and show a higher
growth rate of sales than the nonfamily firms. However, sales
growth is heavily affected by sectoral demand: when the industry-
adjusted growth rate is considered, the over-performance of family
firms does not appear to be substantial.
Profitability does not differ significantly between owners: the
ratio of the operating income on sales and on total assets is close
to the sample average for family firms, whereas it is slightly lower
for industrial companies and higher for financial companies. As
for the sales growth, state-owned firms are low performers also
in terms of pure profitability.
On average, family firms are moderately smaller (in assets,
sales, and employees) than other firms and exhibit significantly
higher growth and superior profitability. These characteristics may
raise a concern that, in addition to an industry effect, the superior
performance is driven by the predominance among them of early
stage, high-growth firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). A recent
empirical literature on family firms shows that the superior
performance promptly disappears when family members are
involved in running the company (Miller et al. 2007): second-
generation families are mainly responsible for poor performance
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), as well
as for the inadequate adoption of managerial practices that drives
poor performance (Bloom Van Reenen, 2007).
Table 2 also shows significant differences between family and
nonfamily firms for variables related to control. The share of the
first shareholder is lower in family firms (74.05%), as well as the
Ultimate Owner (UO) ownership share in total (68.48%). Family
and nonfamily firms also differ significantly in their diversification
profile. By counting the number of 4-digit SIC sectors in which
each company operates, in addition to the core sector, the former
appears more prone to being diversified (2.44) than do industrial
(2.16) and financial companies (1.95). A similar result also
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 160emerges from the diversification dummy, which is set equal to one
if the company operates in two or more 4-digit SIC. This pattern
appears to be consistent with the need for family firms’ owners
to diversify their firm instead of their own portfolio. Finally, a
general higher risk aversion of family firms does not appear to be
supported by both the gearing ratio and the ratio of intangible
assets on total assets, which do not differ significantly between
ultimate owners.
Growth rates are significantly higher in companies whose
largest owner is another company (industrial ownership) or a fam-
ily. The discrepancy between profitability and growth seems to be
consistent with the interpretation that for a given ownership share,
financial owners induce companies to increase shareholder value,
whereas industrial and family owners are more concerned about
growth and survival (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, page 701).
3.2 Profitability and Firm Growth by Groups of Ultimate Owners
A first question to be answered is about the characteristics of
the sectors in which firms operate: are family firms in high- or
low-growth sectors? By regressing the industry turnover index ATI
(Aggregate Turnover Index) on four dummies indicating ultimate
owners, we get a measure of the sectoral intensity of growth of
each group of owners. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that family
firms are in sectors that have experienced a growth of total
turnover higher than baseline in the period 1995-2004. The
estimated coefficient is 0.06 and is statistically significant at a 1%
level. Contrarily, industrial and financial companies (and
especially state-owned companies) are in moderate-growth sectors.
The results change slightly if we break up the total sample based
on country: Italian family firms appear to be concentrated in low-
growth sectors, whereas French, German, and Spanish firms in
high-growth sectors (Table 3). Finally, family-owned companies
are prevalent in sectors which perform well in domestic markets,
whereas industrial and financial companies prevail in sectors that
perform well in nondomestic markets. 
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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Seizing market opportunities is a risky activity. For a company
to keep the pace of a rapidly changing or of an increasing demand
is a very difficult task: it involves the ability (or willingness) to
sustain risky decisions that may endanger the control of the
company or even its survival. In the next section, we will provide
evidence on this point. 
By using firm’s sales as the dependent variable (eq. (1)), we can
test the sensitivity of company sales to shock affecting industry ag-
gregate turnover. In order to eliminate the sectoral effect due to the
difference in growth rates between industries, we include the term
ATI among regressors and estimate equation (1). Column 1 in Table
4 reports estimated results from equation (1) in which the type of
owner is interacted with the industry sale variable ATI. Firm sales
react to changes in demand approximately by half the industry
shocks (0.47 – 0.54). Therefore, for family firms the change in de-
mand leads to a 0.40 smaller increase than that for other com-
panies, or only to a 0.10 – 0.12 increase in net sales. The respon-
siveness is higher for industrial companies and financial compa-
nies: even if some differences in estimated values are observed (0.18
– 0.16 for industrial company and 0.12 – 0.11 for financial com-
pany), empirical findings show that the industrial and financial
ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s ability to seize market
opportunities. Contrarily, family ownership shows negative and stat-
istically significant coefficient, thus confirming difficulty in facing
the business risk involved in following the market demand.
Controls for company size, age, and diversification may avoid
ambiguity in the effect of owner identity if systematic differences
in size and other controls affect a firm’s responsiveness to shocks.
Direct effect indicates that firm’s age, size, and diversification do
affect the responsiveness to shocks (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4).
Both age and size have a positive impact on the ability of the com-
pany to follow market demand, whereas diversification reduces
firm’s responsiveness. As the coefficient estimates for interaction
variables remain rather stable despite controls (Columns 5 and 6),
in the following we will focus only on the interaction effects.
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 164How to reconcile this lower responsiveness to shock affecting
industry aggregate turnover with the evidence of good performance
in terms of profitability measures? This result may be consistent
with a hypothesis of risk-avoidance behavior by family firms as
they are unwilling to assume a high business risk, i.e. continuously
changing existing routines, in order to remain top performers.
However, as they do not underperform other type of owners when
pure profitability measures are used, they appear to succeed in
following a cost-reducing or efficiency-seeking strategy. Whereas
the decision to increase sales is inherently risky, and thus may be
avoided, the decision to increase efficiency level may involve a
lower degree of risk, thus providing a viable solution to maintain
profitability in family firms.
7 This result agrees with the result in
recent literature, showing that family members make it a priority
to ensure the survival of the family firms for the next generation
at the cost to forgo growth opportunities (Bertrand and Shoar,
2006).
3.4 Financing and Growth Behavior
In order to test for the presence of risk-avoidance behavior in
the presence of growth opportunities (Almeida and John, 2001),
taking into account the owner preference for self-financing, we use
the well-known concepts of “internally financed growth rate” (IG)
and “sustainable growth rate” (SG), (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksi-
movic, 1998). In contrast to most of the empirical literature that
uses the growth rate of sales or assets as a measure of growth op-
tion, we use these measures because of the linkage they posit be-
tween the financing and growth behaviors. IG is the maximum
growth rate that can be financed if a firm relies only on internal
resources and maintains its dividend. SG is the maximum sus-
tainable growth rate, which expresses the maximum growth rate
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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7 Reliance on family members rather then professional managers may also lead
to inefficiencies in decision making that will, on average, slow a firm’s growth.
However, BLOOM N. - VAN REENEN J. (2007) show that the lower adoption of
management practice in family firms is not systematic and is largely dependent
on the effect of primogeniture in the selection of CEO of the company.
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or to altering the present financial structure. Useful information
on how financing decisions are taken in order to sustain growth
can be derived by the comparison of the actual growth rate (G)
with the internal growth rate (IG) and the sustainable growth rate
(SG). A company growing at a rate below or equal to the IG is
able to fund its growth by relying on internally generated finan-
cial means. For these companies, the growth behavior should not
be constrained by the availability of financial resources. If growth
is higher than SG, then the management uses external resources
in a way that alters the current debt/equity ratio but that is pro-
portional to the internally generated resources.
8 In this last case,
the availability of financial resources (and the ability of the man-
agement to obtain them) plays a crucial role in defining the pat-
tern of growth. Limitation of growth in this panel of companies
may denote a will to maintain the company control by limiting
the amount of external funds in order to lower the risk of com-
pany distress. 
Estimates of the impact of different owner identity are
reported in Table 5. The sample has been split into two different
groups: firms with an actual growth lower than IG (G < IG) and
firms with an actual growth higher than SG (G > SG). The
comparison of regression estimates in columns 1-2 and 3-4 shows
that the negative effect of family ownership is larger for firms with
G>SG than for firms with G < IG.
9 Family ownership hurts
company performance more heavily in fast-growing companies
than in low-growing firms. Contrarily, the positive effect of
industrial ownership is higher in high-growth companies than in
low-growth ones. Finally, for the group of family firms with
nonconcentrated ownership (NC), the estimated results confirm
the prevalent empirical literature which shows that a negative
family effect is usually traced out when family ownership
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
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growth option, yields a similar result.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 167concentration is large and family shareholders cannot benefit from
a diversified position in the company equity. 
3.5 The Impact of Domestic and Nondomestic Markets
If following the market demand is a risky activity, seizing
opportunities in international markets could be even riskier.
Internationalization requires changes in the organization of the
company and the assumption of increasing risk. It may involve a
forced decentralization of power in order to cope with distant
markets, thus endangering the company control within the family.
Complexity could grow excessively and international opening may
be perceived as an option entailing too much risk. Therefore, we
should expect that the sensitivity to market demand could be lower
in international markets than in domestic ones if family ownership
is detrimental for risk acceptance. In order to test this hypothesis,
we estimate equation (2) by separating domestic industry shocks
from nondomestic ones for each of 15 countries in the sample:
(2)
where sales is the turnover of firm i, sector k, time t and country
c, controls is a set of control variables, and time are time dummies.
Similar to previous Eq. (1), the index of industry demand is the
Eurostat Annul Turnover Index (ATI) at country level for the
domestic and nondomestic market. Index m indicates, respectively,
total, domestic, and nondomestic demand. Therefore, each
company’s sales are related to the sectoral Turnover index of its
own country, both for domestic and nondomestic market (e.g. the
sales of an Italian company are regressed on the Italian Turnover
index of domestic market and the Italian turnover index for sales
in nondomestic market). All other symbols are the same as in Eq.
(1). Also in this case, the industry breakdown is for 101 sectors
by NACE 3 digits.
The estimated results are summarized in Table 6. Family
ownership has a negative and largely significant impact on
   
sales a b ATI c F ATI d co iktc ktc
m
ji j k t c
m =+ + + () ( .) ( n ntrols time ti k t c )++ ε
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 169company sales when industry shocks come from nondomestic
markets, whereas the sensitivity is positive for the domestic
market. Contrarily, industrial and financial ownership show an
almost opposite result, with a limited impact on company sales
when shocks are from domestic markets and a substantial positive
effect for nondomestic markets. 
In columns 2, 4, and 6, we allow for the effect of ownership
type to differ based on firm’s age. This additional control does not
significantly alter the estimated coefficients and tends to reduce
slightly their numerical values (except for the state-owned firms),
but leaves the sign of coefficients unchanged. The effect of the age
on the firm’s sensitivity to industry shock is positive, especially for
family and industrial companies, thus confirming a role for the
experience in tackling market demand, especially in nondomestic
markets. For financial-owned companies, the absence of a close
relationship between age and sensitivity may denote a larger
availability for these firms of a set of proprietary advantages and
of specific tools that substitute experience in facing the market. 
4. - Implications for Sectoral Competitiveness
Aghion  et al. (2005), Bertrand and Shoar (2006), and Zell-
weger (2007) argue that a negative relationship between the con-
centration of family firm and GDP growth at country level should
be expected because of the lower incentives to growth associated
with family owners. In discussing the role of banks in sustaining
the long-term growth of Japanese economy, Morck and Yeung
(2006) suppose a similar conclusion by claiming how a governance
model that prefers contractual claimants (debholders) to residual
claimant (shareholders) may affect the long-term prospect of
growth by decreasing the level of risk attitude of the business sec-
tor. Aghion and Howitt (1992); Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005); and Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2005) argue that the in-
vestment underlying ‘catch up’ growth and those required to ‘keep
up’ are fundamentally different. Once the technological frontier
has been reached, “keeping up” growth requires sustained in-
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 170novation. This, in turn, requires a tolerance to risk and instabili-
ty. Therefore, a trade-off of growth against stability (risk) may
emerge as a macroeconomic effect of a micro-economic risk-avoid-
ance behavior by prevalent owners (Morck and Yeung, 2006).
A similar trade-off may also emerge at the sectoral level if a
different sensitivity to demand shocks, notably in nondomestic
markets, arises as a result of a risk-avoidance behavior. Graph 1
shows the relationship between the standard deviation of sectoral
growth rates for 103 European manufacturing sectors and the
share of family firms in each sector. Using the standard deviation
as a proxy for the degree of sectoral “instability” (or risk), this
evidence further supports the assumption of low tolerance for risk
in family firms, which previous estimates have already signaled.
Therefore, a sector may be expected to be less keen to tolerate
instability, thus failing to achieve sustained growth, if family firms
are pervasive. Even if rather illustrative, this data are in line with
the hypothesis that governance of corporation is not an
unimportant issue in determining the sectoral competitiveness if
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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GRAPH 1
STANDARD DEVIATION OF SECTORAL ATI (1996-2004) AND SHARE
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 171different governance systems affect firms’ risk-taking behavior
(Bianchi et al., 2005; Tucci et al., 2007).
5. - Concluding Remarks
The large differences in the ownership structure by owner
identity may raise a concern about the different abilities of
individual owners to shape the company strategy. As organizations
may take risk by searching alternative routines and opportunities
that changes the status quo (venturing risk), differences in firm
sensitivity to market demand may reflect owners’ attitude to take
venturing risk. 
The paper uses the sensitivity of firm’s sales to industry shock
as a measure of the owner’s attitude toward venturing risk and
growth. Empirical evidence shows that owner identity does affect
the ability of the company to react to demand shocks. Consistent
with a hypothesis of risk-avoidance behavior, small and medium-
sized family-owned companies appear to under react to changes in
market demand, notably when ownership is highly concentrated
and growth options are significant. However, they confirm their sta-
tus of good performers when pure profitability measures are used.
Conversely, industrial and nonconcentrated family-owned firms ap-
pear more prone to deal with venturing risk, especially when the
intensity of the risk is large, as in the case of fast-growing com-
panies or when there are demand shocks in nondomestic markets. 
This result raises the question if sectoral competitiveness may
be negatively affected by a large incidence of family-owned firms
at the sectoral level. If the under reaction of family firms to
demand shocks is consistent with a general risk-avoidance
behavior, then a ‘family firm-intensive’ sector may be expected to
be less keen to tolerate instability, thus failing to achieve sustained
growth. Data from a large number of European sectors provide
descriptive empirical support to this conclusion. As a result, the
governance of corporation comes out to be a key issue in
determining the industry dynamics at the sectoral level if different
governance systems affect firms’ risk-taking behavior.
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 173Amadeus BvDEP Information - Data From Ownership Data-
Base
BvDEP Independence Indicator
To assist users in identifying independent companies, BvDEP
has created an Independence Indicator to characterize the degree
of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders.
The BvDEP Independence Indicators are noted as A, B, C, D, and
U. 
Indicator A is attached to any company with known recorded
shareholders, none of which having more than 25% of direct or
total ownership. This indicator is further qualified as A+, A, or A-
depending on the number of identified shareholders (6 or more,
4-5 or 1-3). BvDEP also gives an A notation to a company that is
mentioned by a source (Annual Report, Private Communication or
Information Provider) as being the Ultimate Owner of another
company, even when its shareholders are not mentioned. A
companies are called “Independent companies”. 
Indicator B is attached to any company with a known
recorded shareholder, none of which with an ownership
percentage (direct, total or calculated total) over 50%, but having
one or more shareholders with an ownership percentage above
25%. Also, this indicator is further qualified as B+, B, and B-
according to the same criteria relating to the number of recorded
shareholders as for indicator A. 
Indicator C is attached to any company with a recorded
shareholder with a total or a calculated total ownership over 50%.
The qualification C+ is attributed to C companies in which the
summation of direct ownership percentage (all categories of
shareholders included) is 50.01% or higher. The C indicator is also
given to a company when a source indicates that the company
has an ultimate owner, even though its percentage of ownership
is unknown. 
Indicator D is allocated to any company with a recorded
shareholder with a direct ownership of over 50%. Indicator U is
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fication.
Ultimate Owner Identification
To define an Ultimate Owner, BvDEP analyzes the share-
holding structure of a company having a BvDEP Independence In-
dicator different from A+, A, or A- (which means that the com-
pany is independent and consequently has no Ultimate Owner). It
looks for the shareholder with the highest direct or total % of
ownership. If this shareholder is independent, it is defined as the
Ultimate Owner of the subject company and a UO link is created
between the subject company. If the highest shareholder is not in-
dependent, the same process is repeated until BvDEP finds an Ul-
timate Owner. Each entity at both ends of a link — shareholder






– Mutual and pension fund
– Foundation & Research institute
– Public authorities, States, Governments





– Unnamed private shareholders
– Other unnamed shareholders aggregated
The last three categories (Public; Unnamed private share-
holders, aggregated; Other unnamed shareholders, aggregated) are
considered as unable to exert, as such, control over a company.
They are disregarded in the qualification of the degree of inde-
pendence of a company and, as a consequence, in the process of
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
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07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 175identification of the possible Ultimate Owner of a company. The
shareholder information is gathered from several possible sources,
including Annual Reports or privately written communications ad-
dressed by the company to BvDEP. Although BvDEP characterizes
each entry by a “type”, it scrupulously respects the wording and
spelling given to each entry by the source.
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
176
07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 176BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGHION P. - HOWITT P., «A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction», Econo-
metrica, no. 60, 1992.
AGHION P. - HOWITT P. - MAYER-FOULKES D., «The Effects of Financial Development
Convergence: Theory and Evidence», Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 120
(1), 2005.
ALMEIDA-BRITO J. - JOHN K., «Leverage and Growth Opportunities: Risk-Avoidance
Induced by Risky Debt». EFMA 2001 Lugano, available at SSRN,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=269580
ANDERSON R. - REEB D., «Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Ev-
idence from the S&P 500», Journal of Finance, no. 58 (3), 2003.
BERTRAND M. - MEHTA P. - MULLAINATHAN S., «Ferreting out Tunneling: An Appli-
cation to Indian Business Groups», Quarterly Journal of Economics, no. 117,
2002.
BERTRAND M. - SCHOAR A. «The Role of Family in Family Firms», Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, no. 20 (2), 2006, pages 73-96. 
BIANCHI M. - BIANCO M. - GIACOMELLI S. - PACCES A.M. - TRENTO S., Proprietà e con-
trollo delle imprese in Italia. Alle radici delle difficoltà competitive della nostra in-
dustria, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2005.
BLOOM N. - VAN REENEN J., «Measuring and Explaining Management Practices
Across Firms and Countries», Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 122, no. 4,
2007.
BRUNNINGE O. - NORDQVIST M. - WIKLUND J., «Corporate Governance and Strategic
Change in SMEs: The Effects of Ownership, Board Composition and Top Man-
agement Teams», Small Business Economics, no. 29, 2007. 
BVDEP, Ownership Database, Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing, 2006. 
CLAESSEN S. - TZIOUMIS K., «Ownership and Financing Structures of Listed and
Large Non-Listed Corporations», Corporate Governance, no. 14/4, 2006. 
CUCCULELLI M. - MICUCCI G.,  Measuring Age Effect in Entrepreneurship and Busi-
ness, mimeo, 2006. 
— — - — —, «Family Succession and Firm Performance. Evidence from Italian
Companies», Journal of Corporate Finance, no. 14 (1), 2008. 
DEMIRGUC-KUNT A. - MAKSIMOVIC V., «Law, Finance and Firm Growth», Journal of
Finance, vol. 53, no. 6, 1998.
DEMSETZ H. - VILLALONGA B., «Ownership structure and corporate performance»,
Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, 209-233.
FACCIO M. - LANG L., «The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corpora-
tions», Journal of Financial Economics, 2002.
FAMA E., «Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm», Journal of Political Econ-
omy, no. 88, 1980.
FOGEL K. - MORCK R. - YEUNG B., «Big Business Stability and Economic Growth:
Is What’s Good for General Motors Good for America?», NBER, Working Pa-
pers, no. 12394, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
FRYDMAN R. - HESSEL M. - RAPACZYNSKI A., «Why Ownership Matters?», Columbia
Law School, Working Paper, no. 172, 1998.
GOMEZ MEJIA L. - HAYNES K.T. - NUNEZ-NICKEL M. - JACOBSON K. - MOYANO-FUENTES
J., «Socio-Emotional Wealth and Business Risk in Family-Controlled Firms: Ev-
Owner Identity and Firm Performance, etc. M. CUCCULELLI
177
07 Cucculelli_147_178  12-06-2009  14:23  Pagina 177idence from Spanish Olive Market», Administrative Science Quarterly, no. 52,
2007, pages 106-137.
GOODSTEIN J.G. - BOEKER W.B., «Turbulence at the Top: A New Perspective on Gov-
ernance Structure Changes and Strategic Change», Academy of Management
Journal, no. 34 (2), 1991.
GROSFELD I. - ROLAND G., «Defensive and Strategic Restructuring in Central Euro-
pean Enterprises», Emergo, Journal of Transforming Economies and Societies,
no. 3 (4), 1996.
KOTEY B., «Goals, Management Practices and Performance of Family SMEs», In-
ternational Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, no. 11, 1, 2005.
LA PORTA R. - LOPEZ DE SILANES F. - SHLEIFER A. - VISHNY R., «Corporate Owner-
ship Around the World», Journal of Finance, 1999.
MAURY B., «Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from
Western European Corporations», Journal of Corporate Finance, no. 12, 2, 2006,
pages 321-341.
MILLER L. - LE BRETON-MILLER I. - LESTER R. - CANNELLA A., «Are Family Firms
Really Superior Performers?», Journal of Corporate Finance, 2007.
MOLLY V. - LAVEREN E. - JORISSEN A., Financing and Growth Behaviour of Family
Firms: Differences between First- and Next-Generation Managed Firms, mimeo,
2006.
MORCK R. - YEUNG B., «Purifying Japan’s Banks: Issues and Implications», Asian
Economic Papers, no. 5 (1), 2006.
OKOROAFO S.C., «Internationalization of Family Businesses: Evidence from North-
west Ohio, USA», Family Business Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 1999, pages 147-158.
PEDERSEN T. - THOMSEN S., «Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest Euro-
pean Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity», Journal of Management and
Governance, 2003.
THOMSEN S. - PEDERSEN T., «Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in
the Largest European Companies», Strategic Management Journal, 2000.
TUCCI A. - BARBA NAVARETTI G. - FAINI R., «Does Family Control Affect Trade Per-
formance? Evidence from Italian Firms», CEP, Working Paper, no. 405, 2006.
SRAER D. - THESMAR D., «Performance and Behaviour of Family Firms: Evidence
from the French Stock Market», Journal of the European Economic Association,
no. 5 (4), 2007.
UPTON N. - TEAL E.J. - SEAMAN S.L., «Growth Goals, Strategies and Compensation
Practices of US Family and Non-Family High-Growth Firms», The Internation-
al Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, no. 4, 2, 2003.
VILLALONGA B. - AMIT R., «How do Family Ownership, Control and Management
Affect Firm Value?», Journal of Financial Economics, no. 80, 2006.
WISEMAN R.M. - BROMILEY P., «Toward a Model of Risk in Declining Organisations:
An Empirical Examination of Risk, Performance and Decline», Organisation Sci-
ence, no. 7, 1996.
ZAHRA S.A., «Entrepreneurial Risk Taking in Family Firms», Family Business Re-
view, no. 18(1), 2005, pages 23-40.
ZELLWEGER T., «Time Horizon, Cost of Equity Capital and Generic Investment
Strategies of Firms», Family Business Review, vol. XX, no. 1, 2007.
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA MARCH-APRIL 2008
178
07 Cucculelli_147_178  3-06-2009  12:47  Pagina 178